Fact in proof and cause of action in legal reasoning of civil judicial decisions: functional analysis approach

Abstract

This paper attempts to define the functions and role of the fact in proof and the cause of action in the procedure of judicial reasoning in civil cases. Functional analysis of interaction by T. Parsons and S. Toulmin model of argument are the methodological prerequisites of this paper. The experience of applying these methodological tools proved their general validity for the functional analysis of the fact in proof. However, the research also demonstrated the restrictions of these instruments in analysis of the specific texts of Russian civil judicial decisions. Thus, these instruments were modified. As a result, it was found out that the cause of action and the fact in proof should be considered as independent functional elements of judicial interaction. The purpose of the article is to identify the functions of the fact in proof and the cause of action in judicial reasoning? To this end, the modified models were applied to the material of a certain case. Case analysis showed how judges use their procedural powers to define the fact in proof. The author has not only identified the functions of the fact in proof in the legal reasoning, but also revealed the drawbacks of the judicial argumentation itself. The author has also made the hypothesis that these drawbacks had been intentionally introduced in the legal reasoning. As a result, the author has made a conclusion that the cause of action is a framework for defining a specific fact in proof. The fact in proof itself has the functions of specifying the thesis (legal claims), structuring argumentation, and defining (broadening/narrowing) the argumentative scope.

Keywords:

law, legal reasoning, analysis of judicial decisions, communication, interaction, functional analysis, proof, fact in proof, cause of action