On the naturalization of law

Abstract

This essay presents one of the possible answers to the question of how to naturalize law. The first part is devoted to discrepancies around the concept of naturalization itself. Two versions of naturalism are considered: ontological and methodological ones. Then the author presents three main points of view on naturalization of law. The first one is defined as the separation. Supporters of the separation declare that there is no way to naturalize law, that there is no link, not even an irregular logical connection between the legal and scientific knowledge. The second position is a radical naturalization according to which the legal knowledge simply forms a part of the scientific knowledge. The final approach is called moderate naturalization. According to this concept, the connection between the scientific and legal knowledge is not as strong as a material equilibrium. It can take the form of supervenience or something similar. The author comes to the conclusion about the need to search for an alternative concept of naturalization of law which would make it possible to show the relationship between the scientific and legal knowledge more accurately. In conclusion, the author outlines the framework of the alternative concept according to which the measure of the naturalization of law is the degree of logical cohesion of its descriptor foundations with the achievements of natural sciences.

Keywords:

methodological naturalism, radical naturalization, alternative concept of naturalization, moderate naturalization, ontological naturalization, separation, versions of naturalism